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Abstract
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage
and Hospitals/Residents problems, stable matchings can have dierent sizes. The
problem of nding a maximum cardinality stable matching in this context is known
to be NP-hard, even under very severe restrictions on the number, size and position
of ties. In this paper, we describe polynomial-time 5/3-approximation algorithms for
variants of these problems in which ties are on one side only and at the end of the
preference lists. The particular variant is motivated by important applications in large
scale centralised matching schemes.
1 Introduction
Background
An instance I of the Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (HRT) comprises a set R =
fr1; : : : ; rn1g of residents and a set H = fh1; : : : ; hn2g of hospitals. Each resident ri 2 R
has an acceptable set of hospitals that she ranks in order of preference, with ties (consisting
of two or more hospitals of equal preference) being permitted, forming ri's preference list.
Meanwhile each hospital hj 2 H ranks in order of preference those residents who nd hj
acceptable, again with ties being permitted, yielding hj 's preference list. Finally, hj has
an associated capacity, denoted by cj 2 Z+, indicating the number of posts that hj has. If
a resident ri and a hospital hj appear on each other's preference list then (ri; hj) is called
an acceptable pair. If hj precedes hk on ri's list then ri is said to prefer hj to hk (with
prefer being dened analogously in the case of a hospital).
An assignment M is a set of acceptable pairs. If (ri; hj) 2 M , we say that ri is
assigned to hj , and hj is assigned ri. For any q 2 R [H, we denote by M(q) the set of
assignees of q in M . If ri 2 R and M(ri) = ;, we say that ri is unassigned, otherwise
ri is assigned. Similarly, a hospital hj 2 H is under-subscribed, full, or over-subscribed
according as jM(hj)j is less than, equal to, or greater than cj , respectively.
A matching M is an assignment such that jM(ri)j  1 for each ri 2 R and jM(hj)j  cj
for each hj 2 H (i.e., each resident is assigned to at most one hospital, and no hospital
is over-subscribed). For convenience, given a resident ri 2 R such that M(ri) 6= ;, the
notation M(ri) is also used to refer to the single member of the set M(ri).
An acceptable pair (ri; hj) is a blocking pair for a matching M , or blocks M , if ri is
either unassigned in M or prefers hj to M(ri), and simultaneously hj is either under-
subscribed in M or prefers ri to at least one member of M(hj). A matching for which
A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of COCOON 2007 [14].
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there is no blocking pair is said to be stable. (This notion of stability is also referred to as
weak stability in contexts where other forms of stability are discussed [11, 15, 16].)
HRT is an extension of the classical Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) (or College
Admissions problem) introduced by Gale and Shapley [4]. In an instance of HR, all
preference lists are strictly ordered. The classical Stable Marriage problem (SM) can be
viewed as a restriction of HR in which each hospital has capacity one, n1 = n2 = n and
the preference lists are complete (i.e., the set of acceptable pairs is precisely R  H). In
such a case, the residents and hospitals are more commonly referred to as the men and
women respectively.
Gale and Shapley proved that, for every instance of SM, there is at least one stable
matching, and they described an O(n2) time algorithm to nd such a matching; this has
come to be known as the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This algorithm is easily extended to the
case in which the numbers of men and women dier and preference lists are incomplete
(SMI { Stable Marriage with Incomplete lists, which is a special case of HR in which each
hospital has capacity one), and it has complexity O(L) in this case, where L is the sum
of the lengths of all of the preference lists [6]. In the case of SMI, not all men and women
need be assigned in a stable matching.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm may be applied from either the men's side or the women's
side, and in general these two applications will produce dierent stable matchings. When
applied from the men's side, the man-optimal stable matching is found; in this case, every
man has the best assignee that he can have in any stable matching, and every woman the
worst. When the algorithm is applied from the women's side, the woman-optimal stable
matching results, with analogous properties. Exceptionally, the man-optimal and woman-
optimal stable matchings may coincide, in which case this is the unique stable matching,
but in general there may be other stable matchings { possibly exponentially many [13] {
between these two extremes. However, for a given instance of SMI, all stable matchings
have the same size and assign exactly the same sets of men and women [5, 22].
Two variants of the Gale-Shapley algorithm have also been formulated for the HR
context [6, Section 1.6], with the complexity also being O(L) in each case, producing
the resident-optimal and hospital-optimal stable matchings, with analogous optimality
properties to those of the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings in the SM
case, respectively. For a given instance of HR, all stable matchings have the same size,
assign exactly the same set of residents, and ll the same number of posts at each hospital
[5, 22].
The situation for HRT is dramatically dierent. Again, at least one stable matching
exists for every instance, and can be found in O(L) time by breaking all ties in an ar-
bitrary way to give an instance of HR, and applying the Gale-Shapley algorithm to that
instance. However, the ways in which ties are broken can signicantly aect the outcome.
In particular, not all stable matchings need be of the same size, and in the most extreme
case, there may be two stable matchings M and M 0 with jM j = 2jM 0j [20]. Furthermore,
the problem of nding a stable matching of maximum cardinality for an instance of HRT
{ problem MAX-HRT { is NP-hard [20]. This hardness result holds even if each hospital
has capacity one { in other words, for the so-called Stable Marriage problem with Ties
and Incomplete lists (SMTI), thus establishing NP-hardness of the problem MAX-SMTI.
Furthermore, the result holds even under severe restrictions on the ties: for example, if
the ties are on one side only, each list contains at most one tie, and that tie, if present, is
at the end of the list [20].
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Practical applications
The practical importance of stable matching problems arises from their application in the
assignment of applicants to positions in various job markets. The Hospitals/Residents
problem gained its name because of its widespread application in the medical employment
domain [1, 12, 21, 22, 24].
Variants of the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm for HR are routinely used in a number
of countries, including the United States [21], Canada [1] and Scotland [24], to allocate
graduating medical students to hospital posts, and in a variety of other countries and
contexts. In large scale matching schemes of this kind, participants, particularly large
popular hospitals, may not be able to provide a genuine strict preference order over what
may be a very large number of applicants, so that HRT is a more appropriate model than
HR. If articial tie-breaking is carried out, either by the participant, because a strictly
ordered list is required by the matching scheme, or by the administrators of the scheme,
prior to running an algorithm that requires strict preferences, then the size of the resulting
stable matching is likely to be aected. Breaking ties in dierent ways will typically yield
stable matchings of dierent sizes; what would be ideal would be to nd a way of breaking
the ties that maximises the size of the resulting stable matching, but the NP-hardness of
this problem makes this an objective that is unlikely to be feasible.
One restricted case of HRT that has arisen in practice, for example in the Scottish
Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) [12, 24], is where each resident's preference list is
strictly-ordered, and each hospital's list may contain one tie, of arbitrary length, at the
end of the list. The correspondingly restricted version of SMTI, where each man's list is
strict and each woman's list may contain one tie at the end, is, of course, the special case
of the restricted HRT problem in which all hospital capacities are equal to one. We refer
to these restricted versions of SMTI and HRT as Special SMTI/HRT (SSMTI/SHRT),
and use the terms MAX-SSMTI and MAX-SHRT for the problems of nding maximum
cardinality stable matchings in these cases, which remain NP-hard problems [20].
Figure 1 shows an example of SSMTI in which there are two stable matchings, M1 =
f(m1; w2); (m2; w1)g of size 2 and M2 = f(m1; w1)g of size 1. A tie in the preference lists
is indicated by parentheses.
Men's preferences Women's preferences
m1 : w1 w2 w1 : ( m1 m2 )
m2 : w1 w2 : m1
Figure 1: An instance of SSMTI with stable matchings of sizes 1 and 2.
Related results
It is straightforward to establish that there can be at most a factor of two dierence
between the sizes of a maximum cardinality stable matching and a minimum one for an
instance of SMTI or HRT [20], and as a consequence, breaking ties arbitrarily and applying
the appropriate version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm gives 2-approximation algorithms
for MAX-SMTI and MAX-HRT. A number of improved approximation algorithms for
versions of MAX-SMTI have recently been proposed.
For the general case, Iwama et al. [17] gave an algorithm with a performance guarantee
of 2   (c log n)=n, for the case of n men and n women, where c is a positive constant.
This was later improved to 2   c0=pn [18], where c0 is a positive constant such that
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c0  1=4p6. Very recently, Iwama et al. [19] gave the rst approximation algorithm
for the general case with a constant performance guarantee better than 2, namely 15=8.
From the inapproximability point of view, Halldorsson et al. [7] showed the problem to be
APX-complete, and Halldorsson et al. [8] gave a lower bound of 21/19 on any polynomial-
time approximation algorithm (assuming P 6= NP ). This lower bound applies even to
MAX-SSMTI.
As far as special cases are concerned, Halldorsson et al. [8] gave a (2=(1 + T  2)-
approximation algorithm for the case where all ties are on one side, and are of length at
most T { so, for example, this gives a bound of 8/5 when all ties are of length 2. If ties are
on both sides and restricted to be of length 2, a bound of 13/7 is shown in [8]. Halldorsson
et al. [9] also described a randomised algorithm with an expected guarantee of 10/7 for
the same special case.
`Cloning' hospitals
It is known that, by identifying residents with men, and `cloning' each hospital into c
women, where c is the hospital's capacity, an instance I of HR may be transformed in
linear time to an instance I of SMI such that there is a bijective function between the
set of stable matchings in I and those in I [6, p.38] (see also [23, pp.131-132]). A formal
proof of this result is given in [2, Lemma 3.1] for the Stable Multiple Activities problem,
a many-to-many non-bipartite generalisation of HR. It is not dicult to extend this proof
to the HRT case, thus giving a correspondence with SMTI. To be more precise, it can be
shown that an instance I of HRT may be transformed in linear time to an instance I  of
SMTI with the property that there is a function, surjective in this case, between the set
of stable matchings in I and those in I, under which matching cardinality is preserved.
An immediate consequence of this correspondence between HRT and SMTI is that,
given an approximation algorithm A for MAX-SMTI with performance guarantee , for
some constant  > 1, we may obtain (except in certain cases) an approximation algorithm
for MAX-HRT with the same performance guarantee, simply by applying A to I  and
mapping the obtained stable matching S in I to a stable matching S in I such that
jSj = jSj. The special cases that cause an exception to this occur when A depends
on certain properties of the preference lists which are not preserved under `cloning': an
example of such a property is the length of the ties in the residents' lists, which are
in general inated under such a transformation. This implies that the approximation
algorithms for MAX-SMTI mentioned in the previous subsection, except for those with
performance guarantees 13/7 and 10/7 [8, 9], also yield approximation algorithms for
corresponding versions of MAX-HRT with the same performance guarantees.
The contribution of this paper
In this paper, we present a polynomial-time 5/3-approximation algorithm for MAX-SHRT,
thus improving on the 15/8 bound for the general MAX-HRT case [19]. Since MAX-SSMTI
is a special case of MAX-SHRT, the algorithm also applies to the former problem, and
we point out some simplications that apply in the one-to-one case. We also show that
this guarantee is the best that can be proved for the algorithm, either for MAX-SSMTI or
for MAX-SHRT, by providing a family of instances of the former problem for which this
bound is realised.
In view of the observations regarding `cloning' hospitals in the previous subsection, it
would have been sucient to present only the MAX-SSMTI version of our approximation
algorithm. However neither the extension of the algorithm to the MAX-SHRT case, nor
the derivation of its performance guarantee, are signicantly more dicult than for the
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MAX-SSMTI case. We therefore choose to focus on MAX-SHRT in view of the fact that
the above `cloning' transformation has the undesirable property that the number of women
in I is greater than the number of hospitals in I by a factor of C=n2, where C is the
sum of the hospital capacities in I and n2 is the number of hospitals in I. Moreover, if
the minimum hospital capacity in I is c, then the total length of the preference lists in
I is greater than the total length of those in I by a factor of 
(c). For these reasons, in
practical applications such as SFAS and its counterparts in the US and Canada [24, 21, 1],
direct algorithms for nding stable matchings in HRT are routinely employed without
resorting to `cloning' together with the use of algorithms for SMTI. Moreover, a variant of
our algorithm for MAX-SHRT has already been implemented and is utilised by SFAS. It is
thus with algorithmic eciency in mind that we present a direct approach for MAX-SHRT.
We nally remark that, in a preliminary version of this paper [14], an approximation
algorithm for MAX-SSMTI was presented with a claimed performance guarantee of 8/5.
That bound turned out to be incorrect. This paper not only establishes the correct bound
of 5/3 for the approximation algorithm in the MAX-SSMTI case, but also extends the
algorithm and the derivation of the same performance guarantee to the MAX-SHRT case.
2 The approximation algorithm for MAX-SHRT
Algorithm SHRT-APPROX Phase 1
Let I be an instance of SHRT; recall that in I, each resident's preference list is strict,
and each hospital's preference list is strict except for a tie (of length  1) at the end.
Henceforth we assume the notation and terminology as dened for an instance of HRT in
the previous section.
The rst phase of the algorithm is a variant of the hospital-oriented Gale-Shapley
algorithm for the standard Hospitals/Residents problem [6, Section 1.6.2]. During this
phase, zero or more deletions are made from the preference lists { by the deletion of the
pair (ri; hj), we mean the removal of hj from ri's list and the removal of ri from that of hj .
Initially, every resident is free and every hospital is assigned the empty set of residents.
Throughout, aj denotes the number of residents currently assigned to hospital hj . As long
as there is a hospital hj for which aj < cj and which has more than aj untied residents
on its current list, the resident ri in position aj + 1 is (at least temporarily) assigned to
hj , and aj is incremented. If ri was already assigned, say to hk then that assignment is
broken, and ak is decremented. Then all pairs (ri; hl) such that ri prefers hj to hl are
deleted. This phase of the algorithm is summarised in Figure 2.
We now use aj to denote the number of residents assigned to hospital hj on termination
of Phase 1 of the algorithm, and we let bj be the total number of untied residents remaining
in the preference list of hospital hj . Then it follows from the loop condition that aj =
min(bj ; cj). A resident ri can be assigned to at most one hospital, so that if ri is one of
the rst aj residents on the list of hospital hj , she cannot be one of the rst ak residents
on the list of hk for any hk 6= hj. Hence the number of assigned residents is x =
Pn2
j=1 aj .
We denote this set of assigned residents by X, and call its members the X-residents. The
remaining residents form the set X , and are the X-residents. At each point during the
algorithm's execution, the current preference lists are referred to as the reduced lists.
Lemma 2.1. On termination of Phase 1 of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX,
(i) no deleted pair can belong to a stable matching;
(ii) for each hospital hj, the rst aj residents on hj's reduced list are assigned in every
stable matching, i.e., each X-resident is assigned in every stable matching.
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assign each resident to be free;
for (each hospital hj ∈ H)
aj = 0;
while (there exists a hospital hj such that aj < cj
and hj has > aj untied residents on its list)
{
ri = resident in position aj + 1 on hj 's list;
assign ri to hj ;
aj++;
for (each successor hk of hj on ri's list)
{





delete the pair (ri, hk) from the preference lists;
}
}
Figure 2: Phase 1 of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX
Proof. (i) Suppose that (ri; hj) is a deleted pair that belongs to a stable matching M ,
and that (ri; hj) was the rst such pair to be deleted in an execution of Phase 1 of the
algorithm. This must have happened because ri became assigned to a hospital hl whom
she prefers to hj . Hospital hl either is under-subscribed in M or prefers ri to at least one
member of the set M(hl). For suppose hl is full in M and prefers all its assignees in M
to ri. Then there exists a pair (rk; hl) in M , already deleted, such that hl prefers rk to
ri, contradicting the fact that (ri; hj) was the rst pair of M to be deleted. Hence (ri; hl)
blocks M , a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose that ri is one of the rst aj residents at the head of hospital hj's reduced
list, and that M is a stable matching in which ri is unassigned. Then, by part (i), hj
is either under-subscribed in M or prefers ri to at least one member of M(hj), so that
(ri; hj) blocks M , a contradiction.
A renement of Phase 1 is possible. If, at any stage, the total number of residents
remaining on the preference list of a hospital hj is at most cj , then we may assign all of
these residents to hj, including any that are in hj 's tie. However, this renement has no
bearing on what happens in the worst case, so for simplicity we choose to omit it.
We call the preference lists that remain after Phase 1 the Phase-1 lists, and if resident
ri and hospital hj are in each other's Phase-1 lists, we say that (ri; hj) is a Phase 1
acceptable pair.
Algorithm SHRT-APPROX Phase 2
We dene the Phase 2 capacity c0j of a hospital hj to be c
0
j = cj   aj. In this phase
of the algorithm, we seek to increase the number of residents who are guaranteed to be
assigned. To this end, we nd a maximum cardinality many-to-one matching, or degree-
constrained subgraph [3], K of residents to hospitals, where a pair (ri; hj) can be in K if
and only if (i) ri is an X-resident, (ii) (ri; hj) is a Phase 1 acceptable pair, and (iii) ri
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is in the tie in hj 's list. Indeed, it is sucient to consider only those hospitals H
0 such
that c0j > 0. Then, for any resident ri 2 X and for any hospital hj 2 H 0, it is immediate
that hj 's tie must be non-empty. The cardinality of the subgraph K is maximised with
respect to the upper degree-constraining function d : R [ H 0  ! N, where d(ri) = 1 for
each ri 2 R and d(hj) = c0j for each hj 2 H 0. That is, hospital hj can be assigned up
to c0j residents, but of course each resident to at most one hospital. Having found such
a degree-constrained subgraph K, we break the tie in each hospital hj 's Phase-1 list by
promoting those residents ri, if any, who are assigned to hj in K, in arbitrary order, ahead
of the rest of that tie (leaving the rest of the tie intact). This produces an instance I 0
of SHRT that is a renement of the original instance I { or more properly, a renement
of the variant of I that results following the deletions of Phase 1; clearly any matching
that is stable for I 0 is also stable for I, but not necessarily vice-versa. Phase 2 of the
algorithm is summarised in Figure 3. (Note that, in the special case of MAX-SSMTI,
since all capacities are 1, the maximum cardinality degree-constrained subgraph is just a
standard maximum cardinality matching.)
V = X ∪H ′;
E = {(ri, hj) ∈ X ×H ′ : (ri, hj) is a Phase 1 acceptable pair and ri is in hj 's tie};
construct the bipartite graph G = (V, E);
K = maximum cardinality degree-constrained subgraph in 〈G, d〉 ;
for (each pair (ri, hj) ∈ K)
promote ri ahead of the tie in hj 's list;
reactivate the loop of Phase 1;
Figure 3: Phase 2 of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX
Lemma 2.2. On termination of Phase 2 of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX, for each hospital
hj, every untied resident who is among the rst cj residents on hj's list is assigned in
every stable matching for I 0.
Proof. The proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 2.1(ii).
Note that, while Lemma 2.2 can be expected, in many cases, to give a stronger lower
bound on the size of a stable matching than is given by Lemma 2.1, this need not be the
case. It is possible that, after Phase 1, each hospital with a positive Phase 2 capacity has
only X-residents in its tie, and that, as a consequence, K is the empty set. However, to
take account of the general case where K is non-empty, we now partition X to reect this
fact. More precisely, we dene Y to be the set of residents who are assigned in K, and
dene Z = X n Y , so that X, Y and Z constitute a partition of the set of residents. The
residents in sets Y and Z are referred to as Y -residents and Z-residents respectively. We
denote jXj, jY j and jZj by x, y and z respectively. Let P denote the set of hospital posts
in I, say
P = fpj;k : 1  j  n2 ^ 1  k  cjg:
(Of course, in reality, the hospital posts are indistinguishable, but it is convenient, for our
purposes, to label them.)
The next lemma gives a precise consequence of the fact that the degree-constrained
subgraph K found in Phase 2 has maximum possible cardinality.
Lemma 2.3. Let M be a maximum cardinality stable matching for I. Then jM j  2x+y.
7
Proof. Dene a subset Q of P as follows:
Q = fpj;k : 1  j  n2 ^ 1  k  ajg:
Then as observed in the paragraph before Lemma 2.1, jQj = Pn2j=1 aj = x = jXj. (In fact
we can construct a perfect matching A1 of X to Q as follows: if ri is the kth-best assignee
of hj upon termination of Phase 1, add (ri; pj;k) to A

1.)
Dene Q = PnQ. During Phase 2, a maximum matching K of X to H 0 is found,
with respect to the capacities c0j = cj   aj for each hospital hj 2 H 0. This gives rise to a
matching K of X to Q which can be seen as follows: with respect to an instance I  of
HR obtained from I by arbitrarily breaking ties, if ri is the kth-best assignee of hj in K,
add (ri; pj;aj+k) to K
. Then jKj = jKj = y, and K is a maximum matching of X to Q.
Now dene M  from M as follows: if ri is the kth-best assignee of hj in M (with respect
to the same tie-break instance I), add (ri; pj;k) to M. Then jM j = jM j. Moreover for
each pair (ri; pj;k) in M
, at least one of the following holds: (a) ri 2 X; (b) pj;k 2 Q; or
(c) ri 2 X and pj;k 2 Q. The number of pairs satisfying (a) is x, the number satisfying
(b) is also x, and the number satisfying (c) is at most y, since y is the size of a maximum
matching of X to Q.
Algorithm SHRT-APPROX Phase 3
Phase 3 of the algorithm involves completely breaking the remaining ties and then applying
to the resulting instance of HR the standard Gale-Shapley algorithm (in fact, for consis-
tency with Phases 1 and 2, the extended version of that algorithm that deletes redundant
entries from the preference lists { see [6]). The algorithm may be applied from either the
residents' or the hospitals' side; as is well known, the size of the resulting matching will be
the same in each case. We choose to apply the algorithm in Phase 3 from the residents'
side, as is typically done by practical matching schemes that incorporate a variant of the
Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Tie-breaking is carried out according to just one restriction, namely, for each tie, the
Z-residents are given priority over the X-residents and Y -residents. In other words, each
tie is resolved by listing the Z-residents that it contains, in arbitrary order, followed by
the X-residents and Y -residents that it contains, again in arbitrary order. (Intuitively,
because we know that X-residents and Y -residents will be assigned no matter what, we
want to maximise the chances of Z-residents being assigned.) It is immediate that the
algorithm produces a matching that is stable for the original instance of HRT. For an
instance I of HRT, we denote by I 00 an instance of HR obtained by application of Phases
1 and 2 of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX, followed by tie-breaking according to this rule.
Again it is immediate that a matching that is stable for I 00 is also stable for I. Phase 3 of
the algorithm is summarised in Figure 4.
The performance guarantee
Let A be a matching produced by application of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX, and let M be
a maximum cardinality stable matching for the original instance I of HRT. As previously
established, all of the X-residents and Y -residents are assigned in A. Let us call the
residents, necessarily Z-residents, who are assigned in M but not in A, the extra residents
(for M relative to A). Also, a hospital hj that has at least one extra resident assigned to
it in M will be called a key hospital.
Lemma 2.4. (i) Each key hospital is full in A.
(ii) A key hospital prefers, according to its preference list in I, all of its A-assignees who
are X-residents, if any, to any extra resident.
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for (each hospital hj)
break the tie (if any) in hj 's list, placing the Z-residents ahead of the others;
// Now apply the standard Gale-Shapley algorithm from the residents' side
assign each resident to be free;
for (each hospital hj)
aj = 0;
while (some resident ri is free and ri has a non-empty list)
{
hj = rst hospital on ri's list;
assign ri to hj ;
aj++;
if (aj ≥ cj)
{
rk = resident ranked in position cj among those assigned to hj ;
for (each successor rl of rk on hj 's list)
{









return the set A of assigned pairs;
Figure 4: Phase 3 of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX
Proof. Let hj be a key hospital, and let ri be an extra resident (necessarily a Z-resident)
who is assigned to hj in M . Recall that M is stable for the original instance I, while A
is stable for the rened instance I 00 (of HR), and therefore also for the instances I 0 and I
(of SHRT).
(i) By denition, ri is not assigned in A, so that if hj is not full in A then the pair (ri; hj)
blocks A.
(ii) Let rk be an X-resident who is assigned in A to hj . We note that the pair (rk; hj)
could not have been deleted by Phases 1 or 2 of the algorithm, since it is in A, and nor
could the pair (ri; hj), since ri is in Z and only pairs (r; h) with r 2 X [ Y are so deleted.
If hj prefers ri to rk then the pair (ri; hj) blocks A in I, a contradiction. If ri and rk
are tied in hj 's list then, as argued above, that tie was still intact at the start of Phase 3,
and when it was broken to form I 00, ri, being a Z-resident, must have preceded rk in the
resulting strict preference list. Hence, since ri is unassigned in A, the pair (ri; hj) blocks
A in I 00, a contradiction.
Let M be a maximum stable matching in I. Fix an arbitrary tie-break instance I  of
I. Form a matching M  as follows: if (ri; hj) 2 M and ri is the kth-best assignee of hj
in M according to the preferences in I, add (ri; pj;k) to M. Then jM j = jM j. Form
A from A in an analogous way (with respect to the same tie-break instance I ). Then
jAj = jAj.
If (ri; pj;k) 2 M and ri is an extra resident, dene pj;k to be an extra hospital post. By
Lemma 2.4(i), each extra hospital post is assigned in A. Partition the extra residents into
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three sets, namely T , U and V according as the post they are assigned in M  is assigned
in A to an X-resident, a Y -resident or a Z-resident, respectively. Let jT j = t, jU j = u
and jV j = v.
Our next lemma gives us certain inequalities involving the sizes of matchings M and A
that will enable us to establish the claimed performance guarantee for Algorithm SHRT-
APPROX.
Lemma 2.5. (i) jM j  jAj+ t + u + v.
(ii) jAj  x + y + v.
(iii) jAj  2t + u + v.
Proof. (i) The number of extra residents is t+u+ v, and, by denition, these are the only
residents who are assigned in M but not in A.
(ii) Each extra hospital post pj;k that is assigned in M
 to a resident in V is assigned in
A to a Z-resident. This gives us v of the Z-residents who are assigned in A, and together
with all x + y of the X-residents and Y -residents who, by Lemma 2.2, are assigned in A,
we have a total of x + y + v distinct residents who are assigned in A.
(iii) By Lemma 2.4(i), all t + u + v extra hospital posts are assigned in A. Let ri be a
resident in T , and let hj be the hospital that ri is assigned to in M . By denition of T ,
hj has an X-resident, say rk, as an assignee in A. By Lemma 2.4(ii), hj prefers rk to ri.
Now the X-residents are assigned in every stable matching, so in particular are assigned
in M . Suppose that (rk; pl;a) 2 M. Then pl;a cannot be an extra hospital post, since
the residents assigned to extra hospital posts in M  are Z-residents. We claim that pl;a is
assigned in A. This is true if j = l by Lemma 2.4(i), hence suppose that j 6= l. It follows
that rk prefers hl to hj , for otherwise (rk; hj) would block M . Furthermore, pl;a must be
assigned in A, for if not, the pair (rk; hl) would block A. Hence the claim is established,
and gives a further t hospital posts (none of which are extra hospital posts as previously
observed) that are guaranteed to be assigned in A, and together with the extra hospital
posts, a total of 2t + u + v such hospital posts.
We are now in a position to establish our main theorem.
Theorem 2.1. For a given instance of SHRT, or of the special case SSMTI, let M be a
maximum cardinality stable matching and let A be a stable matching returned by Algorithm
SHRT-APPROX. Then jM j  5jAj=3.
Proof. From Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.5 part (ii) we have
jM j   jAj  x  v: (1)
By Lemma 2.5 parts (ii) and (iii) we have
jAj  max(x + y + v; 2t + u + v)  1
2
((x + y + v) + (2t + u + v))  x=2 + t + u + v;
the third inequality following from the fact that residents in U are assigned in M  to a
post that is assigned in A to a Y -resident, so that u  y. By Lemma 2.5 part (i), this
implies
jAj  jM j   jAj+ x=2: (2)
Combining (1) and (2) gives
jAj  jM j   jAj+ jM j=2   jAj=2 + v=2;
and this, together with the fact that v is non-negative, implies the claimed result.
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Complexity of the algorithm
The worst-case complexity of Algorithm SHRT-APPROX is dominated by the maximum
cardinality degree-constrained subgraph step in Phase 2. Using Gabow's algorithm [3],
this can be achieved in O(
p
n1 + CL) time, where n1 is the number of residents, C is the
sum of the hospital capacities, and L is the sum of the lengths of the preference lists.
In the special case of SSMTI, Phase 2 is standard maximum cardinality bipartite
matching. Using the Hopcroft-Karp algorithm [10], this can be achieved in O(
p
nL) time,
where n is the total number of men and women, and L is the sum of the lengths of the
preference lists.
Tightness of the performance guarantee
This is the tightest bound that can be established for Algorithm SHRT-APPROX, even
in the one-to-one case of SSMTI. Figure 5 shows an SSMTI instance where the ratio of
jM j to jAj is 5=3. The matching M = f(m1; w4); (m2; w5); (m3; w1); (m4; w3); (m5; w2)g is
a maximum cardinality stable matching of size 5. When the algorithm is applied to this
instance, there are no deletions in Phase 1. The pairs resulting from this phase are (m1; w1)
and (m2; w2), so that X = fm1;m2g. In Phase 2, a feasible maximum cardinality degree-
constrained subgraph (or maximum cardinality matching in this case) is K = f(m3; w3)g,
and if this is chosen we have Y = fm3g and Z = fm4;m5g. Phase 3 could break the
remaining ties in favour of m2, in which case it can be veried that the algorithm would
return the matching A = f(m1; w2); (m2; w4); (m3; w3)g, of size 3. By duplicating this
pattern, we can obtain arbitrarily large instances realising the 5=3 ratio.
Men's preferences Women's preferences
m1 : w4 w2 w5 w1 w1 : m1 m3
m2 : w4 w5 w2 w2 : m2 m1 m5
m3 : w3 w1 w3 : ( m3 m4 )
m4 : w3 w4 : ( m1 m2 )
m5 : w2 w5 : ( m1 m2 )
Figure 5: An instance of SSMTI with ratio 5=3
3 Summary and open problems
We have described a polynomial-time approximation algorithm with a performance guar-
antee of 5/3 for a maximum cardinality stable matching in an NP-hard variant of the
Hospitals/Residents problem that is of signicant practical interest, which has a slightly
simplied version for the corresponding variant of the Stable Marriage problem. We have
also shown that this performance guarantee is the best that can be proved for these algo-
rithms.
The most obvious open question to pursue is whether this or a similar approach can
yield useful performance guarantees for more general versions of HRT and SMTI, for
example when there can be a single tie at the end of the lists on both sides, or when the
lists on one side can contain arbitrary ties.
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